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Abstract-Human conversational participants depend upon the ability of their partners to recognize their 
intentions, so that those partners may respond appropriately. In such interactions, the speaker encodes his 
intentions about the hearer’s response in a variety of sentence types. Instead of telling the hearer what to 
do, the speaker may just state his goals, and expect a response that meets these goals at least part way. This 
paper presents a new model for recognizing the speaker’s intended meaning in determining a response. It 
shows that this recognition makes use of the speaker’s plan, his beliefs about the domain and about the 
hearer’s relevant capacities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Human conversational participants depend upon the ability of their partners to recognize their 
intentions, so that those partners may be capable of responding appropriately. For instance, in 
the dialogue below, the speaker’s desires are encoded in a variety of sentence types. 
Dl-1 Sl: I want to see the drawing of the new design layout. 
2 S2: OK. Here it is. (Shows sheet with new design.) 
3 Sl: There isn’t room to put in the color code charts at the bottom of the picture. Can 
you move up the main layout? 
4 S2: Sure, I’ll bring back the new design in half an hour. 
Instead of telling the hearer what to do, the speaker stated his goals, and expected a response 
that met them, at least part way. The sentence forms used were not simply commands, but 
rather declaratives that described a desired state or a new difficulty, or commented on progress, 
This paper presents a model in which recognizing the speaker’s intended meaning plays a 
fundamental part in determining a response. First I describe the methodological nd theoretical 
approaches to this problem, and then I describe a model that enables us to tell what the 
speaker’s intentions are. I will illustrate the model on two examples and compare it to previous 
work. 
The model presented here is particularly powerful because it provides necessary linguistic 
capabilities to a system that understands natural language and presents information on a 
graphics display. In particular, it makes it possible for a system to reason about utterances that 
express errors in planning, to acknowledge those errors and respond to them just as people do 
in conversation. 
2. BACKGROUND FOR A NEW MODEL 
One of the goals of the Knowledge Representation and Natural Language group at BBN has 
been to provide powerful general tools for natural anguage processing and to build a language 
understanding system for a decision maker using a graphics display. We envision a decision 
maker accessing information from a database that can be represented visually; he/she needs to 
collect information from the database, add to it, change it, and define new features. In accessing 
information, the decision maker must be able to express him/herself naturally. S/he must be 
free to use imperatives, declaratives and interrogatives in whatever way is most convenient and 
expressive. 
Natural communication with a language system is possible, however, only if it can be reason 
both about the intent behind the speaker’s utterances and about its own responses to those 
utterances. Such reasoning involves-at least-(l) bringing to bear the kinds of knowledge 
people have before they enter into a given discussion, and (2) making use of the knowledge they 
gain in the discussion. 
As part of our research to provide a sophisticated natural anguage and graphics-oriented 
system (NLGO) for a decision maker, I collected protocols of users communicating with a 
simulated version of the system. The simulated system was actually a person communicating 
in English over a terminal and computer link to a user. For graphics we used an overhead 
viewgraph projector to project the drawings that the person simulating the machine drew. Using 
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an arrangement reported in [ 11, the user was able to point at the display and make changes as 
needed. The protocols consisted of the transcript of communications, all the pictures drawn 
during a session, and notes indicating deictic references to screen objects.+ When I analyzed 
those collections of protocols, I recognized that a NLGO system would require the ability to 
understand eclaratives that: 
0 Describe a desire (e.g. “I want to see a drawing of the new layout”). 
l State a problem (e.g. “There isn’t room to put color code charts in.“). 
l Or function as a comment on progress (e.g. “I’m almost done this part of the layout.“). 
An organizing framework for a system that can reason about the speaker’s intentions has 
been explored in our group and is reported elsewhere[2]. In that framework the group 
experimented with an implementation of Allen’s model[3] of a plan-based approach to speech 
act recognition. This model provided us with a perspective within which to use models or 
speaker’s beliefs and wants[4] as well as a framework for reasoning about the speaker’s 
plan[3]. To include all the types of declaratives given above within the framework I found that I 
needed to expand the existing model for reasoning about plans in two ways: (I) by recognizing 
a richer form of plans than Allen’s model permitted, and (2) by making explicit the connection 
between the speaker’s intentions as structured by his plans and the response intended by the 
speaker. 
3. DEFINING INTENDED SPEAKER MEANING 
My goal is to provide a computational model of the hearer’s interpretation of the speaker’s 
intended meaning. The intended meaning of an utterance I define as that set of pairs of 
propositional attitudes (e.g. belief, want, intend), and propositional contents that the speaker 
wants the hearer to hold by means of the utterance. 
The notion of the intended meaning of an utterance can be illustrated by contrasting it with 
that of semantic meaning. The semantic meaning of a declarative utterance is the propositional 
content assigned to that type of utterance by the semantic rules of the language. For instance, if
someone says, “You’re a prince”, the semantic meaning is that the person addressed by the 
speaker is the son of a king. By contrast, the intended meaning depends on the psychological 
state of the speaker at the time and place of utterance. The speaker may mean that he thinks 
the hearer is a really nice guy and wants to tell him so, or he may be saying something quite 
different. The speaker, using irony, may mean that the addressee is just the opposite of a nice 
guy. 
This example demonstrates that the speaker’s intended meaning, though correlated, is not in 
general identical with semantic meaning. Comprehending the semantic meaning of the utterance 
forms the basis for discerning the intended meaning, but understanding the intended meaning 
also requires the hearer to use: 
(1) The characteristics of the current situation. 
(2) The speaker’s beliefs and goals. 
(3) The context of discussion (the discourse context) as a special aspect of (1). 
(4) Conventions for action that exist between the speaker and hearer.+ 
(5) The mutual beliefs of the speaker and hearer (those beliefs the hearer knows to be 
shared with the speaker) concerning (l)-(4). 
A sample exchange will indicate the role of these kinds of information. In the example 
below, the user is interacting with our NLGO system to display some information about ATN 
grammars. The user’s first two utterances are simple, direct imperatives that indicate that the 
user wants the NLGO system to display a part of the net and then move the focus to a subpart 
of the display. 
D2-1 U: Display the clause level network. 
2 S: (display of network) OK. 
+A deictic reference is one where a person uses a linguistic phrase to refer to something by pointing at it. The person 
may actually point his finger. cock his head or otherwise physically point or he may simply use a phrase that makes clear 
he’s pointing. 
*This, of course, is relevant only to a special class of situations, a class that includes the kind of interaction the BBN 
system must handle. 
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3 U: Now focus on the preverbal constituents. 
4 S: (display of subnet, not including S/AUX) OK. 
5 U: No, I want to see S/AUX. 
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What does the user mean by his/her third utterance (D2-5)? The answer depends on what s/he 
believes about the network objects to which s/he referred. Suppose s/he thinks that S/AUX is 
part of the preverbal constituents (which it actually is). Then s/he is communicating that the 
display is wrong and what’s wrong with it; s/he intends for S/AUX to be included in the display 
with the other constituents. Suppose, alternatively, that s/he thinks that SlAUX is not part of 
the preverbal constituents. S/he is still indicating that s/he wants to see S/AUX, but also that 
s/he has changed his/her mind about the display and intends SlAUX to be visible, perhaps 
without any other objects on the screen. This discourse, similar to one discussed in [2], could be 
handled by the prototype discussed there only by including SlAUX with other constituents on 
the screen. Reasoning about the user’s overall task and the relation of S/AUX to it was not 
considered. 
In choosing among its available responses, the NLGO system must use its mode1 of the 
user’s beliefs about the domain and its model of what the user takes to be mutually believed 
between the two of them about that domain. For example, the user might have thought that 
S/AUX was one of the preverbal constituents, and thought the NLGO system believed this 
also. S/he would then have expected and intended the NLGO system to include that state in the 
display. If the user had been right about this belief, the NLGO system would indeed have 
included it. Since it did not, the user’s “No” indicates to the NLGO system some bug in the 
communication, a bug stemming either from the user having a faulty model of the domain 
(because S/AUX is not defined as a preverbal constituent) or from faulty expectations about the 
NLGO system’s mode1 (because S/AUX is a preverbal constituent, but the system does not 
know this). 
Suppose alternatively that the NLGO system doesn’t conclude that the user thinks S/AUX 
is among the preverbal constituents, and it believes that s/he takes that idea to be mutually 
believed. Then it must again use its models of the user and of the user’s model of itself to 
determine what action is intended. For example, does the user intend the system to compress 
the current display to make room for S/AUX, or should it erase the current display and bring up 
a new one, centered on S/AUX? This decision may depend on the kinds of conventions alluded 
to in (4) above. In general, of course, people’s behavior in conversational situations also 
depends on the relative status of the conversational partners, on what the participants think will 
benefit themselves, as well as not harm others and the like. These social considerations are 
significant o human interaction, but for the remainder of this paper, let us assume that the 
NLGO system responds in a slavishly cooperatine way, i.e. it has no interest beyond serving 
the user. 
There are two ways to view the intentions of another agent. The first is simply in terms of 
one’s beliefs about what the other person wants and believes. This is keyhole recognition (see 
[5]). One person decides what he thinks another intends simply by observing him through a 
keyhole; e.g. I decide that you are looking for your umbrella, because you look around the room 
with your coat on, when I believe you believe that it’s raining outside). Keyhole recognition of a 
user’s wants is central to Genesereth’s MACSYMA advisor[6]; it also forms the basis of plan 
recognition in both Schmidt et a!.‘~[71 work on BELIEVER system and in Wilensky’s story 
understanding(81. 
The intended recognition of what someone is doing, on the other hand, is relevant for 
communicative situations[9,3]. A speaker says something to a hearer and intends the hearer to 
recognize the intention that lies behind the utterance. The speaker is attempting to “give the 
hearer a piece of its mind” and it’s essential to the success of the speaker’s attempt hat the 
hearer recognize it as such. In Allen’s terms, the shared recognition by the hearer of intention 
occurs when the speaker says something to the hearer because the speaker wants the hearer to 
believe the speaker wants something. That is, H believes S wants H to think (believe) that S 
wants something (HBSWHBSW). In the example D2-5 above, shared recognition is involved 
in the fact that the user wants the NLGO system to believe her statement, a statement about 
the user’s wants. Generally the hearer, in responding to the speaker, must take into account not 
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only the shared recognition of the speaker’s intentions but also the beliefs that the speaker 
assumes are shared with the hearer (in Cohen’s model[4] these are beliefs in the context 
HBSBHBSB). Occasionally the hearer’s own beliefs about a situation will differ from the 
shared beliefs (called mutual beliefs hereafter) and influence the hearer’s response. Just how 
this occurs will be illustrated later. 
4. MODEL OF RECOGNITION OF INTENDED MEANING 
The hearer’s task in recognizing what the speaker meant by an utterance is to be understood 
as follows: 
(1) To produce an explanation for the utterance, stated in terms of the speaker’s beliefs and 
wants. 
(2) To use the explanation as a basis for a response. 
I use the term “explanation” because the hearer is trying to answer the question “why did 
the speaker say that to me?” The answer to this question-the proffered explanation of the 
speaker’s act in uttering what s/he did-in turn produces new beliefs about the speaker; these 
will form part of the basis of the hearer’s response. 
The explanation, in general, will have the form of a set of pairs of propositional attitudes 
and propositional contents attributed by the hearer to the speaker [E.g. (belief, that S/AUX is 
part of the preverbal constituents) (Want, that I display all components of the preverbal 
constituents), etc.] Certain beliefs play a central role in explaining why the speaker said what he 
did: 
EXPLANATORY BELIEFS 
(1) Beliefs about the speaker’s goal and the plan to achieve it, 
(2) Beliefs about the hearer’s capacities, 
(3) Beliefs about the hearer’s dispositions to act given information about the speaker’s 
wants. 
To produce an explanation, the system must have a model that infers beliefs of these kinds and 
that distinguishes between the speaker’s intended responses and some helpful but unintended 
responses. I want the NLGO system to recognize and produce the intended response whenever 
possible, and to be able to produce a helpful response when appropriate. 
To model the construction of the required explanation, we begin with &ice’s theory of 
speaker meaning[9,10]. Grice notes that there are certain kinds of evidence normally available 
to an audience on the basis of which the audience is intended to draw certain conclusions about 
the speaker’s intended meaning. These kinds of evidence include (1) the features of the 
utterance, and (2) mappings between those features and propositional attitude-propositional 
content pairs that the audience (assumed to be a competent speaker/hearer of the language) is
supposed to be able to grasp, and is intended to grasp. For example, the feature; DECLARA- 
TIVE, will be mapped to the speaker’s wanting the hearer to believe the speaker believes the 
propositional content of the utterance; while imperatives will be mapped to the speaker’s 
wanting the hearer to believe the speaker wants the hearer to bring about the state of affairs 
expressed by the propositional component of the utterance. 
Somewhat more formally; an audience who, for the utterance of a certain sentence S, the 
speaker believes to have certain attributes? A, is expected to be able to recognize certain 
features of the utterance and to be able to draw from those features certain conclusions about 
what the speaker intended in uttering S in that context. These conclusions include: 
Intended conclusions 
(1) S has certain features (call them Fl . . . Fn). 
(2) S is correlated, in virtue of such features and the rules of the language, with the pair 
(P, PC(S)). 
(3) The speaker intends the audience to believe that the speaker p’s that PC(S). 
(4) By sincerity (see below), the speaker does p that PC(S). 
tone such audience attribute, of course, is competence in the language of S; others are both interesting and more 
specific to the situation. 
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[In the above, “p” is a schematic letter that takes verbs of propositional attitude as 
arguments; “PC”, a schematic letter that takes declarative sentences as arguments.] We can 
apply this theory directly to the sample dialogue. For example, let us consider a sample 
utterance from the dialogue D2, understood, however, as the initial utterance of a discourse: 
Sl: I want to see S/AUX. 
Intuitively, we would like the theory to allow us to show how a computer system (call it S) would 
conclude that the user (U) wants to see S/AUX, and the user wants it to believe that s/he has 
this desire. 
The set of relevant features F, attributes A and mappings C include: 
0 Fl = Sl is in declarative mood. 
0 F2 = S1 was uttered intentionally by U. 
0 F3 = Sl was intentionally directed at S. 
0 Al = S is a computer system with a graphics display, and U knows this. 
0 A2 = S believes U is sincere. 
0 Cl = is a rule that maps Fl to U’s wanting S to believe that U believes that U wants to 
see S/AUX.S 
The system will make default assumptions about F2, F3, Al and A2, recognize that Fl, and 
apply Cl to Sl. The NLGO system can then use the intended conclusions and infer directly 
that: 
(1) U intended (S to recognize) that Sl is correlated with U’s wanting S to believe that U 
believes that U wants to see S/AUX (derived from intended conclusion 3 and Cl). 
In order for the NLGO system to conclude that simply U wants to see S/AUX, it must 
apply two additional rules§ it has available. The first, a sincerity rule, allows it to deduce: U 
believes that U wants to see S/AUX. By a rule of reliability, it can conclude: U wants to see 
S/AUX. This, of course, is what, on intuitive grounds, we wanted the NLGO system to 
conclude. Now we must ask what it will do with this conclusion. 
5. EXTENDING THE MODEL 
While the Gricean framework provides a starting point for recognizing the speaker’s 
communicative intentions, it does not provide a recipe for inferring the intended response. 
Given, for example, that the user wants the NLGO system to believe that the user wants to see 
S/AUX, and nothing more, the system could simply say “Yes, I understand”, (or “Let me add 
that to my data base of beliefs about you”)-a behavior the user probably did not intend. At the 
same time, the NLGO system could decide to provide a lot of information by showing the whole 
ATN network and highlighting S/AUX. Such behavior might even be helpful; but it is not, we can 
presume, the intended response. 
To determine the response the user intended, the NLGO system must consider the utterance 
in a larger situational context. This context is determined by what (it thinks) the user is doing, 
what (it thinks) the user thinks the NLGO system can do, and how cooperative (it thinks) the 
user takes the NLGO system to be. The system will generate explanations that take into 
account the larger situational context as a means for responding as intended. We have 
augmented the Gricean framework to enable the NLGO system to derive a situation-specific 
explanation for the user’s having the wants and beliefs s/he is believed to have. In particular, 
the system can be viewed as asking itself for an explanation of some of the beliefs it attributes 
to the user. The explanation is like that given earlier. For example, to explain why the user 
+Actually the hearer may be intended to have a different propositional attitude p’ toward a related proposition. For 
simplicity. I’ll assume these are the same. 
$The general form of the Cl rule is: for declarative sentences map to U wants audience to believe that U believes 
PC(s): for imperative sentences map to U wants audience to believe that U wants audience want PC(s). 
@imply stated, these rules. for the case of belief, are: Sincetity: If x wants y to believe that x believes that 4, then x 
believes that q. Reliabilif~: If .V believes tha: x believes that q and that x is reliably informed about q. then y will believe 
that q. The basis for these rules is the intuition that the speaker is sincere about his beliefs, and that what he believes he 
believes reliably. at least for certain subject matters, such as his own present state of mind. 
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wants the system to perform some action, the system would infer that the user is pursuing a 
plan in which that action is a step. 
An example will illustrate what I have in mind. For utterance Sl above and the conclusions 
about the user’s wants regarding S/AUX given previously, the NLGO system seeks to explain 
(1) Why the user wants the NLGO system to believe that the user wants to see S/AUX. 
(2) Why the user wants to see S/AUX. 
To answer the first question, the system determines whether any of the plans it has provision- 
ally attributed to the user contains this step; and if so, it determines what relevant capacities the 
user believes it to have. For the case at hand, suppose that the system has knowledge of several 
plans a user may undertake concerning S/AUX. These include getting the system to delete 
SlAUX from the screen, getting the system to change the arcs on S/AUX and finding out what 
other nodes its arcs connect to. To explain (l), the system will look to see if it has attributed 
any one of these plans to the user. Since Sl is the first utterance in an exchange, we can 
suppose the system has not attributing any plans to the user. 
Since no plan is known, it can try to decide if one of the possible plans could be in effect on 
the evidence that the user wants the system to have beliefs about the user wanting to see 
S/AUX. However, this want offers too little evidence to determine which plan could be in 
effect. Since no plan explanation is available to the system, it turns to explanations about it 
capacities that may be relevant o seeing S/AUX. Should it find one that the user is also aware of, 
it can conclude that this is the intended response. Among its capacities, it will find one that will 
enable the user to see S/AUX, namely, to display it on the screen. So the system concludes that 
the user intends this capacity to be used, and since the system is cooperative, the system 
produces a display. 
When the system turns to explaining (2), its task is rather simple-certain user desires are 
primitive to the system. For such desires the system does not try to generate any further 
explanation. 
This extended theory depends not only on the Gricean framework but also on the ability to 
create an explanation based on the user’s plans. This last involves: 
(1) Recognizing the correlations between utterance features and pairs of propositional 
attitudes and propositional content. 
(2) Using the attributes (A) of the NLGO system (described above in Grice’s theory). 
(3) Determining the goals of the user from the propositional attitudes, where the goals are 
structured in a hierarchy of goals and subgoals. 
(4) Deciding on the capacities of the NLGO system (mutually believed to be capacities) that 
are relevant o the speaker’s goals. 
(6) Using the speaker’s recognized goals as an expectation model for the remaining part of 
the discourse. 
To implement this model, I am using a number of available AI. tools (the implementation is 
not complete). The NLGO system must have definitions of a number of plans, so I am using 
Sacerdoti-based procedural networks of plans [1 I]. Beliefs and wants must also be represented, 
and this I am relying on Allen’s and Conen’s models of belief and want contexts. A crucial 
aspect of this model is a method of “parsing” the user’s wants as steps in plans; I am currently 
studying algorithms using an ATN formalism, but modified to allow for bugs in a plan, 
recognizable with a small bug library (see [12]). This model bears some similarity to 
Genesereth’s plan recognizer [6]; it is distinguished because it recognizes plans incrementally 
and can proceed with only a partial plan and several possible additional plans. This method 
makes it possible to use a plan, once selected from the collection of plans by unique substeps, 
as an expectation device for the remaining part of a discourse. Finally, I use standard 
antecedent reasoning for deducing the correlations between utterance features and pro- 
positional attitudes, and for relating user plans and the NLGO system’s capacities. 
6.REASONlNGABOUTAUSER'S"BUGGY"PLANS 
In the previous discussion, I have shown the utility of explanations reflecting (among other 
things) beliefs about the speaker’s goals and about his beliefs about the NLGO system’s 
capacities. Now I will demonstrate what additional reasoning such a model enables. In 
particular, I will show that such explanations provide a NLGO system with a means of 
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discerning bugs in a user’s plan. I will show how the system can understand that a declarative 
utterance can express a bug in the user’s plan; that declaratives may state problems about the 
user obtaining what s/he and expects, or that may describe difficulties in proceeding to the next 
part of what the user plans to accomplish. The model of speaker meaning presented so far makes 
it possible to interpret such utterances. 
The example concerns the first part of a scenario where the NLGO system is interacting 
with a user when a graphics display is available for representing information about a database. 
D3-1 U: I want to see the Generic Concept named employee. 
2 S: OK. (Display concept in mid-screen.) 
3 U: I can’t fit a new Individual Concept below it. 
4 U: Can you move it up? 
5 S: Sure. (Moves up the Generic Concept.) 
6 U: OK. Now make an Individual Concept for employee whose first name is “Sam” 
and whose last name is “Jones”. 
In this dialogue, the user wants to view a kind of database concept called a Generic Concept. 
The database has generic concepts for many things, including employee, company, office, and 
the like. Then the user indicates a difficulty with Individual Concepts, which are particular 
examples of Generic Concepts. His intent is to have the system create a new Individual 
Concept of an employee and insert some particular information about it. 
To respond to the user’s “Can you move it up ?” the NLGO system must determine whether 
the user meant his/her utterance directly as a question about the system’s abilities, or whether 
the user intended to direct the system to move the concept under discussion. Its choice depends 
on inferring the speaker’s plan and, in particular, on what it believes the user thinks its own 
capacities are. 
This example illustrates a feature of natural interchanges: a user may have a plan in mind, 
and carry out a part of it, without considering possible undesired side effects; when one occurs, 
s/he may recognize and eliminate it. In D3 the user is carrying out the plan of accessing the 
Concept for EMPLOYEE so that s/he can add a new employee to the database. S/he wants the 
system to display the EMPLOYEE Concept, but has not foreseen that its display location 
might be inappropriate. After the inappropriateness i discovered, the user indicates the 
difficulty and expects it to be corrected. Just how the bug that is reflected in D3 is corrected 
depends on whether the user already believes that the system can move things up and intends 
the system to do so, or whether s/he has to find this out first. 
From the NLGO system’s point of view, the decision about what the user means may cause 
it to respond differently in various cases. Suppose the system thinks the user believes that the 
system is able to move up concepts on the screen. Then when the user indicates that his/her 
plan has a flaw (D3-3) the system must conclude that the user’s plan is blocked by the lack of 
space for a new concept. When the user asks about being able to move the employee concept, 
the NLGO system will conclude that the user intends to tell the system to perform the move by 
asking about a precondition of the action that the user wants, since the system is intended to 
move up the concept, not simply to answer the question. 
A different scenario is as follows. Suppose the NLGO system thinks the user is unaware 
that the system is capable of moving up the concept. Then, when the user indicates that his/her 
plan has a flaw and asks about the employee concept, the system will conclude that the user 
intends to find out whether it has that ability, as part of finding a means of resolving the block. 
In this case, if the system moves the concept, that is a bit of helpful behavior, one not intended 
to be recognized as intended by the user. 
I will outline in some detail how the NLGO system reasons in such contexts by showing 
what plans are deduced, what rules are needed, and how the reasoning proceeds in the case of 
D3-3 and D3-4. The relevant user plan is: 
Add-Data(User)(netpiece)(data)(screen-location) 
step I : Consider-aspect (User)(netpiece) 
step 2: Put User (data) at (screen-location) 
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The Add-Data plan states that to add data, a user must consider some aspect of a network 
part (netpiece) and then put some data at a screen location. Even after recognizing from D3-I 
that the user wants some data displayed, the system cannot deduce that Add-Data is the user’s 
plan. Since there are many ways to consider some aspect of a net (ask for a display, think about 
it, ask to be informed about its contents), as well as many other plans for which displaying a 
netpiece is a first step, the user cannot be understood to have intended the system to recognize 
that his/her plan was to Add-Data from the utterance D3-1. All the system can conclude is that 
the user wants the employee concept displayed, and it responds accordingly. 
In reasoning about D3-3, “I can’t fit a new Individual Concept below it”, the NLGO system 
concludes that among the user’s intentions mutally presumed to be recognized is that the user 
produced a declarative utterance with the propositional content that the user cannot fit a new 
Individual Concept (abbreviated indiv2) below the Generic Concept (abbreviated generic 1): 
BELIEFI: (Say User System (Declarative (Not (Can User (Fit User indiv2 (below 
generic I)))))) 
From this, the system concludes that the user wants the system to believe that the user believes 
that it can’t fit indiv2 below genericl, and that the user in fact believes that he can’t. The system 
then infers the embedded proposition [(Not (Can.. .))I, and that the user intended that that 
proposition be mutually believed. The system uses a (default) rule NOTCAN below, 
NOTCAN: Whenever a user says that s/he can’t bring about a certain state of affairs or 
perform a certain typical action, then the user is telling the system that it wants that state 
of affairs brought about. 
and concludes that it is intended to believe that the user wants it to believe WANTl: (Fit User 
indiv2 (below generic I)). 
The system seeks a partial explanation of this intention. As in other cases, it seeks an 
explanation realting the intention to the user’s plans, its own capacities and the assumptions of 
cooperation. So far it knows the user has enacted a plan to consider an aspect of the network 
(D3-1 is evidence for this), and it knows of several plans for which the first step is considering 
an aspect of the network. By examining those plans for the role of WANTl, it can notice that in 
the add-data plan, step 2 is the user putting some data at a screen location, and that fitting 
indiv2 below generic1 is a specific means for putting. It uses this information to decide that of 
all the plans it knows of the add-data plan is the intended plan. 
Now the system can bring to bear a rule to the effect that it believes that the user has 
informed it that s/he can’t perform a certain action which s/he wants to perform (as part of 
some plan s/he is pursuing), then it should conclude that (I) the user wants to unblock the 
action, (2) as part of unblocking, the user will get the system to perform an action that does the 
unblocking. Here the user wants the Put action unblocked. 
How the system is expected to respond depends upon whether the system 
believes that the user believes there is some action available to the system relevant to this 
unblocking. In fact, the NLGO system might have several relevant capacities for making 
room (such as moving up screen objects or erasing the screen). Two responses are possible in 
this situation. First if the system believes the user knows it has several capacities and hence 
believes that the user wants to exploit one of them, it must await further information to 
determine which one was meant. When the user asks “Can you move it up?” on the basis of 
having attributed to the user the unblock plan, the system can interpret he user’s question as a 
way of bringing about a move-up action rather than simply a desire for information. Even if no 
such request as “Can you move it up?” were to follow, the NLGO system would have a basis 
for asking about the user’s intent (“Do you want me to move up the concept or empty the 
screen?“). 
An alternative response will result from different belief about the user. If the NLGO system 
believed that the user was unaware of its capacities to move screen objects up, it would reason 
no further on D3-3 (again, because it has not recognized any intention on the part of the user 
that it act). D3-4 allows the system to deduce that the user wants to know if it can move 
generic] up, since yes-no questions are taken as signalling intensions to know if. The system, 
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in seeking an explanation, can conclude that this is the first step of a plan to find an agent with 
the capacity to move up screen objects. The system also knows that once such an agent is 
found, it can be asked to move-up as a means of unblocking the put action. To produce this 
explanation the system must piece together evidence for several plans in just the same way it 
did to determine that the Add-Data plan was in effect. 
The system will use its explanation about finding an agent with a move-up capacity to 
determine that it must respond by telling the user it can move up the display. It may also decide 
to move up genericl, but this choice is made as helpful behaviort because the system has only 
recognized that the user may ask for a move-up but s/he has not stated any intention to move 
up yet. 
In both of the above cases, the plan to Add-Data to the screen is known to be in effect. 
Hence once the bug is cleared away, the NLGO system is prepared to interpret subsequent 
utterances in light of this plan. The user’s subsequent utterance in D3 requests that the system 
make an Individual Concept with a Role first name “Sam” and last name “Jones”, without 
stating where the concept is to be put. Because the system knows that this request is part of 
Add-Data, it can determine the intended location for the Individual Concept on the screen- 
below the Generic Concept for EMPLOYEE. In this way, the plan creates expectations for the 
next portion of the conversation. 
This example ihustrates not only that mutual beliefs about the NLGO system’s capacities 
affect the system’s determination of the user’s intentions, but also that the full explanation of 
each utterance depends the system’s understanding of the user’s goals and subsequent 
utterances. 
7. COMPARISON WITH AN EARLIER APPROACH 
In this section, I present one short example of how Allen’s algorithms, which form the basis 
of my previous work on speaker meaning, proceed on utterances from the domain of 
information about trains in [3]. I will show how my model would proceed and discuss the 
differences in the two approaches. The general framework of considering a speaker’s plans in 
understanding speaker meaning was inspired by Allen’s work. However, my approach differs 
because it uses the knowledge of what the speaker is doing (i.e. his plan) and knowledge of the 
hearer’s (i.e. the system’s) capacities to determine a response. Allen’s model relies largely on 
invoking general rules true for any action; while my model uses some general rules about 
actions, it also brings to bear its knowledge of particular actions the speaker is executing and its 
knowledge of its own beliefs as a hearer about its capacities. Because the model brings these 
kinds of knowledge to bear, it explicitly connects the speaker’s intentions with the response 
intended by the speaker. 
Figure 1 illustrates the processing of Allen’s model for the utterance, “Can you tell me if 
there is a bus to E. Watertown?” Notice that the algorithm assumes that this question maps to 
an s. requesti by actor A to hearer H of an informif by H to A of whether H can do an 
informif of the existence of a bus to E. Watertow. The reader should observe that two speech 
acts, both requests, are identified during the processing (they are underlined in the figure). The 
model, after deducing all the propositions (called the plan), uses them to determine obstacles in 
this plan, obstacles it should overcome. One obstacle it might recognize is: (A Knowif ( 9 bus to 
E. Watertown)). This obstacle can be overcome by an informif. 
By comparison, my model will reason as follows. For the question “Can you tell me if 
there’s a bus to E. Watertown?” H will ask itself why A said that to H and will conclude on the 
basis of “can you” questions that: 
WantO: A wants to know if I (H) can tell him (A) if there’s a bus to E. Watertown. 
Such a want causes the system to ask itself for an explanation of that want. To do so, H uses a 
rule that states that if someone wants to know something and asks a question to a person who is 
believed able to answer that type of question, then an answer is wanted, i.e. 
Wantl: A wants H to tell A if H can tell A if there’s a bus to E. Watertown? 
+This choice is based on rules about helping out when one has an appropriate capacity. As with other heuristics, it may 
be wise to monitor carefully what the system does to be helpful, since some helpful actions can be easily undone, but 
others have serious side-effects. 
iFor definitions of s. request and informif. see [3]. 
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Fig. I. Sample processing for Allen’s model. 
Now H asks why does A want this? H turns his attention to what A is doing and deduces A is 
a stranger in a train station. Such people, H reasons, are usually interested in modes of 
transportation, such as trains and buses, and for getting to places. To find a means of travel one 
can look at a travel book or ask a person who has knowledge such matters. If one chooses to 
ask a person, then one must identify a person with such knowledge. H believes that he is one 
such person and WO indicates that A has decided to find out that H is. Hence H is able to 
conclude that A needs information about modes of travel, rather than just information about 
H’s capacities. Then, by looking at the internal structure of Want I, H can determine just which 
modes of travel A wants to know about, and conclude that A has Want2: 
Want2: A wants me to tell him if there is a bus to EW 
Before going further with H’s reasoning, it is important to see that the particular situation of 
the speaker and hearer are significant to the deductions the hearer can make. The inference to 
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Want2 depends on the fact that both speaker and hearer know that A is a stranger in a train 
station and that such a person wants to know about transportation modes. Furthermore, the 
capacities of the hearer, which are mutually known to hearer and speaker, help the hearer 
explain what the speaker says. Hence H is not merely good at guessing what A wants, but 
rather A intends that H conclude WantO, Want 1 and Want2. 
Just as with Want0 and Wantl, H must ask himself why A wants Want2. Here the answer 
brings to an end any further explanations. A wants information about buses (call that Want3) 
but H cannot draw further conclusions (such as answer to why A wants Want3) because such 
conclusions would involve guessing about S’s wants and desires. There is no reason to believe 
that such guessing is intended by A, so H suspends reasoning further about A’s wants. 
Now that H has established several of A’s wants, we can ask, what does H do with his 
explanation? Two of A’s wants (Want1 and Want2) involve H as the agent of an action wanted. 
H brings to bear knowledge about what A knows of H’s capacities to determine that A intends 
for H to act on these. For the other wants, Want0 and Want3, H may act, as a helpful person, 
in some way H believes appropriate, but his actions are not intended by the communication. In
carrying out Want1 and Want2, H must reason that if he performs the telling of Want2, he will 
also perform the one for Wantl, so that only one action is necessary. 
The major difference in these two models is use of the speaker’s plan. Allen, who takes all 
the conclusions inferred in his model to be part of the plan, does not use the speaker’s overall 
goal in reaching those conclusions. Instead, that goal is the last conclusion reached in his model. 
By contrast, in my model the speaker’s overall goal (to determine a mode of transportation and 
find someone who knows about it) is used early in the processing, in addition to rules about the 
reasons for actions. 
The two approaches also differ on what the hearer takes the intended response to be. For 
Allen’s work, the response consists of overcoming any obstacles that another component of his 
model can identify. Overcoming these obstacles is taken to be the intended act because in 
general the speaker wants the hearer to be as helpful as possible. In my model, helpful behavior 
is distinguished from more directly intended responses uch as Want2. These responses must be 
explicitly related to the speaker’s intentions viewed as a plan. In addition, my model takes into 
account the hearer’s specific capacities, known to speaker and hearer, in determining an 
intended response. 
A final distinction between the two models concerns the utterance and initial conclusions 
drawn from it. Allen assumes that utterances can be mapped into surface speech act forms 
(such as s. request) for .-his model. I have chosen rules that map from the utterance to the 
NLGO system’s first conciusion by conventions about how English is used. The type of 
conclusion drawn is not one that identifies an act that A wants H to perform, but rather states 
some want that A has about his own concerns. 
One difference between the two approaches cannot be easily illustrated in the domain of 
information about trains. I have expanded on the notion of plans originally given in Alien’s 
work to include multistep and interrupted plans. Allen’s model cannot recognize these kinds of 
plans because the model’s plan language is not equipped with a means of describing them. 
In summary, I have presented in this paper a model of the interpretation of speaker meaning 
which takes into account several different kinds of belief: about the current situation of the 
speaker, about the speaker’s goals, about the discourse context, about the speaker’s knowledge 
of the hearer’s capacities, and about the hearer’s conventions for acting. The model, both in the 
abstract and in its computational form, infers an intended response on the basis of these beliefs 
by producing an explanation for each of these beliefs and using that explanation for further 
conclusions about speaker intentions. This model makes possible the recognition of the 
speaker’s intended meaning not only of imperative and interrogative utterances but also of 
declaratives that serve as statements of desires, comments, complaints about problems, checks 
on progress, and announcements of bugs in the speaker’s attempts to achieve his/her goal. 
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